LLF's Alexander Passo Secure $1 Million Settlement After Urgent Care Facility Develops a Bad Case of Breach of Contract

No good deed goes unpunished, as the saying goes. For a firm client that provides medical coding, auditing, and collection services to health care practices, that good deed involved delivering services that helped an Illinois hospital increase revenue and collections, improve efficiency, and decrease outstanding receivables. For fulfilling and exceeding the expectations set forth in its contract with the hospital, our client’s punishment was to be unjustifiably and inexcusably stiffed out of over $1 million in earned and agreed-upon fees.

Fortunately, after filing a federal lawsuit for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, Alex Passo recently secured a settlement on behalf of the client in an amount close to the total sums owed under the contract between the parties. The settlement also resulted in the dismissal of the hospital’s counterclaim in which it alleged that our client failed to provide adequate services, under collected, and jeopardized the facility’s “safety net” status. All of which were red-herrings and unsubstantiated.

Original link - https://www.llflegal.com/llfs-alexander-passo-secure-1-million-settlement-after-urgent-care-facility-develops-a-bad-case-of-breach-of-contract

LLF and Alex Passo Secure Huge Win For Ukrainian Client Against Company Using The War As Cover For Breach of Contract

The war in Ukraine is an unspeakable tragedy on many levels. In addition to the human costs, the invasion also threatened the country’s booming and well-respected technology sector that attracted clients from all over the world. Despite the war’s travails, the perseverance and resilience of Ukraine-based tech companies allowed them to continue serving their clients without disruption or diminished service.

Recently, Latimer LeVay Fyock attorney Alex Passo had the privilege of representing one of those Ukrainian tech companies, securing a six-figure settlement against a client that had tried to use the war as an excuse to get out of its contractual obligations and steal the company’s workers.

LLF’s client, Brightgrove, is a Ukrainian software programming firm that is one of the largest programming outsourcing companies in the world. In 2013, Brightgrove was retained by a U.S.-based client to assemble a dedicated team of developers who would be assigned to provide services to the client. Under the contract between the parties, the client was to pay Brightgrove a monthly fee per developer. Additionally, pursuant to a 2019 amendment to the agreement, the client agreed to pay Brightgrove for the transfer of the team to the client in the event that it terminated the contract and elected to retain the team directly.

After almost ten years of providing such services and four months after the invasion, the client, for the first time ever, expressed dissatisfaction with the services Brightgrove was providing and claimed that the services of the dedicated team were interrupted due to the war. Pursuant to the contract, and well before the war started, Brightgrove had developed a business interruption plan to " mitigate” any interruptions due to a force majeure event, such as a war. With that plan in effect, Brightgrove continued providing undiminished services to its client.

Nevertheless, the client notified Brightgrove in June 2022 that it was terminating the contract and demanded that Brightgrove transfer the team without paying

Brightgrove the transfer fee agreed to in the contract. Brightgrove, understandably, rejected this demand. The client then surreptitiously circumvented Brightgrove and employed the dedicated team members anyway without paying the transfer fee.

Brightgrove saw the client’s actions for what they were – an attempt to use the war as an excuse to get out of its contractual obligations, notwithstanding Brightgrove’s full performance of its responsibilities.

In November 2022, LLF filed an arbitration action on behalf of Brightgrove with the International Chamber of Commerce. The action resulted in LLF obtaining a six-figure settlement for Brightgrove, rebuking its client’s efforts to exploit the tragedy of the war for its own advantage.

The firm congratulates Alex Passo for his work on this matter and was proud to represent this Ukrainian client during this difficult and trying time for their country.

Original link: https://www.llflegal.com/llf-and-alex-passo-secure-huge-win-for-ukrainian-client-against-company-using-the-war-as-cover-for-breach-of-contract

How to Calculate the Statute of Limitations in Illinois

One of the most nerve-wracking parts of practicing as a litigator is investigating and docketing a client’s statute of limitations for their claims.  I can’t count how many times I have double- and triple-checked my docketing for the date a tolling agreement expires and notes out of fear that a deadline might have been miscalculated or missed.  This article provides a brief overview of determining the proper deadline for certain statutes of limitations.

The statute of limitations for a claim begins on its accrual date.  However, the accrual date will differ, depending on the type of claim that is brought.  For example, in tort claims, the clock starts ticking when the party suffers an injury.  Further, for tort claims, you will want to docket not only the normal accrual date but also the date your client potentially discovered that their injury was a result of tortious conduct.  See Moon v. Rhode, 2016 IL 119572 (2016) (holding discovery rule applies to Wrongful Death and Survival actions); see also Carlson v. Fish, 2015 IL App (1st) 140526 (discussing the application of discovery rule in legal malpractice actions). Conversely, in breach of contract cases, the claim’s accrual begins when the contract is breached, not the date when damages occur.

Once you determine your claims’ accrual dates, you will want to determine the appropriate deadline to file the action.  One of the most frequent errors I see is miscalculating a claim’s deadline.  Section 5 ILCS 70/1.11 sets forth the proper procedure to calculate filing times, and states the following:

“The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday or Sunday or is a holiday as defined or fixed in any statute now or hereafter in force in this State, and then it shall also be excluded.  If the day succeeding such Saturday, Sunday or holiday is also a holiday or a Saturday or Sunday then such succeeding day shall also be excluded.”

In simpler terms, if a written contract was breached on November 9, 2019, a party must file their breach of contract action on or before November 10, 2029, because the first day is excluded.  However, the date in this example, November 10, 2029, falls on a Saturday. Therefore, the deadline is extended to November 12, 2029. See Anglin v. Dearth, 175 Ill. App. 3d 367, 369 (1st Dist. 1988); see also Pettigrove v. Parro Constr. Corp., 44 Ill. App. 2d 421, 426-27 (2d Dist. 1963) (holding petition to vacate was timely filed thirty-three days after default because thirty days fell on a Saturday and the following Monday was a legal holiday).  But I recommend filing an action well before any anticipated statute of limitations deadline.

Originally posted on - https://cbaatthebar.chicagobar.org/2020/03/11/calculating-the-deadline-for-the-statute-of-limitations-in-illinois/

Proximate Cause: A Legal Malpractice Case's Hardest Element

Legal malpractice cases are difficult to litigate.  Not only are you facing a defendant that understands how litigation works; but, you also must establish that the attorney’s negligence caused the damages the plaintiff sustained.  This is particularly difficult if the legal malpractice claim is based on the mishandling of litigation because you must litigate two cases within one: 1. the legal malpractice claim; and 2. the underlying case.  Therefore, it is critical to review whether the underlying case has merit before filing a legal malpractice action regardless of whether the handling attorney breached their duty of care.  Simply put, you can have great breach of duty facts against an attorney – i.e. blown statute – but, if the underlying case has no merit, then there is no legal malpractice case.

Brummel v. Grossman, provides an example of how proximate cause issues may arise in prosecuting a legal malpractice claim based upon the handling of prior litigation.  2018 IL App (1st) 170516 (1st Dist. 2018).  There, in 2001, Bruce Brummel had been employed by Nicor Gas (“Nicor”) and had complained to it that he and some of his co-workers had felt ill with symptoms of vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, and fatigue.  Due to his symptoms, Brummel visited a physician who opined that his symptoms were caused by the ingestion of chemicals.  From 2001 through 2003, Brummel and several of his colleagues voiced their concerns to Nicor that the drinking water was contaminated at the facility they worked at, but Nicor took no corrective action. Later in 2003, a City of Aurora inspector visited the site and concluded that the drinking water was contaminated with methylene chloride and/or dichloro methane. Which cause the symptoms Brummel complained he and his co-workers were experiencing.

Brummel went on medical leave around this time, and Nicor placed him on short-term disability, as well.  However, Brummel was required to provide evidence of his disability to Nicore to remain at the company.  Nicor sent Brummel several letters requesting medical documentation for his leave of absence, but he failed to comply with them on a timely basis.  As a result, after his right to a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act had expired, Nicor terminated Brummel in 2004.

Later in 2004, Brummel applied for disability from the Social Security Administration representing that he was disabled.  He was successful in the disability proceedings.  In 2006, Brummel filed a workers’ compensation claim against Nicor arguing that he became disabled as a result of the exposure to the contaminated water at Nicor’s facility.  That claim was inevitably settled for $125,000, and the settlement order stated that Brummel claimed that he was unable to work because of an injury to his whole body, which rendered him permanently and totally disabled.

In 2009, Brummel hired the defendants to bring claims against Nicor for retaliatory discharge and a violation of the Whistleblower Act, alleging that his employment was terminated due to his reporting of the contaminated water to various agencies.  In 2013, Brummel was deposed in the discharge case and he testified that he had not searched for work after his leave of absence in 2003, that he did not provide Nicor medical documentation to support his leave, that during the Social Security proceedings he was adjudicated as disabled, and that he agreed with those findings.

Nicor then proceeded to file a motion for summary judgment arguing that Brummel was unable to prove that Nicor discharged him for his protected activities, and instead Nicor discharged him because he was unable to work due to his disability.  Brummel’s attorneys failed to brief the issue or appear at the hearing.  Unsurprisingly, the motion was granted.

A legal malpractice action then followed, wherein Brummel claimed that the handling attorneys of the whistleblower cased breached their duty by failing to conduct discovery adequately, respond to requests to admit, and failed to brief or argue the motion for summary judgment which led to the case being dismissed.  Some of these omissions are serious enough to give rise to breaches of duty to sustain a valid claim of legal malpractice.  But, the flaw in Brummel’s case was whether these errors were the reason his claim was dismissed. 

The defendant attorneys moved for summary judgment on the basis that Brummel could not prove that his attorney’s negligence was the only reason he lost his case.  Specifically, they argued he lost his case because he had acknowledged that he was disabled in the other proceedings which therefore cut the legs out from his retaliatory discharge and whistleblower case.  Nor was Brummel able to argue that he was not disabled now in his new case under the doctrine of judicial estoppel because such statements would be directly contradictory to the ones he made in his disability and worker’s compensation proceedings. 

Brummel illustrates why due diligence before bringing a legal malpractice case is critical.  If the case relates to the handling of litigation, prior deposition transcripts, affidavits, pleadings, and sworn testimony must be reviewed.  Otherwise you may be walking into a minefield of proximate cause arguments that the underlying litigation was doomed without the negligent attorney’s involvement anyway.

Alex Passo is an attorney at Latimer LeVay Fyock who handles legal malpractice cases throughout Illinois and Indiana.  If you have a matter you would like to discuss with him, you can reach him at (312) 422-8000 or apasso@llflegal.com.

Indiana Couple Defeat Summary Judgment in Legal Malpractice Claim Against Former Attorney in Handling of Loan to Former MLB Player

A couple who brought a legal malpractice claim against their former attorney in connection with his drafting of a promissory note executed by a former MLB player will proceed after they defeated a motion for summary judgment.  Here, in 2014, Elizabeth and Robert Bilbija lent $42,500 to their friend, former MLB player Ryan Thompson.  To document the transaction, Thompson was referred to Christopher T. Lane, who was engaged by Thompson to draft a promissory note.  Notably, he was paid $500 for his services, which was paid evenly by both Thompson and the Bilbijas

Lane drafted the promissory note which provided that Thompson would repay the $42,500 and it was secured by his MLB pension of approximately $8,000 a month.  However, Thompson failed to repay the money and later would file bankruptcy.  The Bilbijas thereafter attempted to claw Thompson’s pension payments by way of the Note to satisfy the debt; but, were informed by the pension authorities that it was only subject to execution for child support or similar debts and they would require a judgment.  This option was not available however due to Thompson’s bankruptcy.

Lane was then sued by the couple for legal malpractice for failing to protect their interests in the transaction.  He subsequently moved for summary judgment on the basis that he owed no duty to the Bilbijas because he allegedly never represented them or communicated through words or actions that he represented them in the transaction.  Arguing that the Bilbijas’ unilateral belief that they were his client does not create a duty.  Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 955 (Ind. Ct. App.).  However, the Court disagreed with this argument, concluding that the Bilbijas insisted that Lane represented them and designated evidence of conduct that would indicate as such. See In re Anonymous, 655 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind. 1995).  Therefore, the Court concluded a question of fact existed to defeat the motion under the principle that the formation of an attorney-client relationship does not need to be express, rather, it may be created by the implied conduct of the parties. 

The Court did grant summary judgment in favor of the attorney on the couples' allegations that Lane breached his duty owed to them due to a conflict of interest.  Indiana has previously held that violations of the rules of ethical conduct alone - including conflicts - cannot create a basis for a claim.  See Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir. 2012).

Alex Passo handles legal malpractice actions throughout Illinois and Indiana.  If you have a matter that you would like to discuss with Alex, you can contact him at apasso@llflegal.com or (312) 284-6256.

Indiana Appellate Court Holds Violations of Rules of Professional Conduct Alone Cannot Form the Sole Basis of Legal Malpractice Suit

Barnes & Thornburg (“BT”) recently avoided a legal malpractice lawsuit based on representing two clients simultaneously that were conflicted.  In the case, a company called CRIT purchased a controlling interest in a nationwide staffing business, Peoplelink, from William Wilkinson.  After the sale, Wilkinson remained with Peoplelink as its CEO until 2015, when he hired BT to represent him in connection with his departure.  The agreement which Wilkinson and Peoplelink ultimately executed contained non-compete language.

After the sale, BT remained as Peoplelink’s outside counsel after Wilkinson left the company; but, continued to represent Wilkinson in other unrelated matters.  As an incidental result of this continued representation of both parties, an attorney at BT accidently sent an email intended for Wilkinson to Peoplelink relating to Wilkinon’s purchase of another staffing company only 7 months after his departure – in violation of the restrictive covenants.

Peoplelink thereafter brought a legal malpractice lawsuit against BT and used violations of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 – which govern attorney’s representation of clients with conflicts of interest – to form the basis of their claim that BT breached their duty to Peoplelink.  However, the Indiana Appellate Court held that violations of the rules alone could not establish a legal malpractice claim and that Peoplelink did not allege that the firm’s malpractice caused any actual damages.  It also reasoned that Peoplelink's argument for disgorgement of legal fees as its basis for damages was not enough to maintain the claim.

CRIT v. Wilkinson, et. al, 2018 Ind. App. LEXIS 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)

Alex Passo and the Patterson Law Firm, LLC handle legal malpractice lawsuits throughout Illinois and Indiana.  If you have a matter that you would like to discuss with Alex, you can reach him at (312) 750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com.

Iowa Criminal Defense Attorney Prevails against Legal Malpractice Claim Brought by Former Client who Pled Guilty to Failing to Disclose he had HIV to Individual prior to Sexual Contact

A Black Hawk County jury found that a Waterloo attorney did not commit legal malpractice in his handling of a criminal matter in 2009.  In the underlying case, the attorney was retained to defend James Metcalf in a criminal matter where the state alleged he had sexual contact with another man without disclosing that he was HIV positive.  Metcalf would plead guilty in this matter and was sentenced to up to 25 years in prison.  Metcalf would later appeal this plea, which was set aside in a 2014 Iowa Supreme Court decision.

Metcalf then sued his former attorney for failing to investigate his case, and if he had, he should not have advised Metcalf to plead guilty because he would have learned that the transmission of HIV would be improbable in light of the medications he was taking.  However, the attorney argued that transmission was nevertheless possible, which still triggered criminal liability under the statute.  After hearing the testimony and arguments, the Black Hawk jury found that the attorney had not committed malpractice.

This was a rather interesting case from a damages perspective, even though the jury's decision did not trigger such an analysis.  Most states hold that plaintiffs in legal malpractice cases can only recover actual damages, and bars recovery for pain and suffering and emotional distress.  However, there has been some traction in jurisdictions to allow recovery for situations such as this one where a party’s constitutional right is lost.  See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987).

Alex Passo and the Patterson Law Firm, LLC handle legal malpractice actions throughout Illinois and Indiana.  If you have a legal malpractice case that you would like to discuss with Alex, you can reach him at (312) 750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com.

Illinois Attorney Censured for Failing to Keep his Disbarred Wife Out of his Office

In June 2014, Ms. Kathleen Niew pled guilty to 10 counts of fraud relating to the handling of her clients’ funds.   Thereafter, in November 2013, Kathleen Niew was disbarred for this misconduct.  Nevertheless, her husband, Stanley Niew allowed her to come into his law offices 4-5 times a week through June 2014.  While in his offices and disbarred, she participated in at least eight client meetings.  As a result, Mr. Niew was censured on two grounds by the Illinois Supreme Court.  The first was allowing his wife to maintain a presence at his law firm despite being disbarred.  The second was for failing to supervise his associate who assisted Ms. Niew in the unauthorized practice of law.

Alex and the Patterson Law Firm, LLC handle legal malpractice matters throughout Illinois and Indiana.  If you have a case you would like to discuss with Alex and can reach him at (312) 750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com.